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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Devon D paid for labor and materials that were used to complete the Nelsons' home,
at the request of Howard Nelson and his contractor Nathan Chappel. Devon D's owner
Gordon Griffin and Devon D's bookkeeper, Pam Rogers, paid for the labor and materials with
checks, following a record keeping practice of writing on the checks the amount attributable
to the Nelson house based on invoices and information they had collected at the time from
Chappel, and the materialmen and workmen. Nelsons had promised to pay Griffin back out
of long term loan proceeds when the house was finished, but refused to do so.
Devon D filed this case to collect back its money, $56,250.76, from the Nelsons, using
its checks and records to prove the amounts of money owed. The Trial Court reviewed the
checks and records as evidence under the business records exception rule, Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 803(6). The Court granted judgment for $41,069.39, but denied by implication
the balance. The Trial Court also denied any pre-judgment interest.
The clear weight of the evidence supports Devon D's full claim and the lower court's
denial of $13,196.38 of that claim was not supported by the evidence. Since the Nelsons
acknowledged Devon D as a creditor to which the owed $120,235.00 in a financial statement
and since Devon D's claim and proof was only for $56,250.76, the full amount of the claim
should be awarded to Devon D. The business records rule supports a judgment for the full
amount of Devon D's claim. Also since the amount of the debt is calculatable in money
damages, and the due date established Devon D is entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant
toU.C.A.§15-l-l.
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STATE OF UTAH

DEVON D. INC., a Utah Corporation,

:

Plaintiff, Appellant,

:

vs.

:
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:
:
:
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2a, section 3(2)(k) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
I his i.s ;ui appeal Hum a Decieeand Miuyiiicni, entered D> llic Court Uccciiiher
29,1992, following a trial to the bench on thr?0th ;iml M ;l ihvsnl Apnl and llir IXlli,
19th and 20th days of May iy92.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
This case presents three issues for review:
1.

WhellnToi nol l,he< "oinl ctred infailingtogiantjudgiucnl.loraddiliun.il
1

sums claimed for labor and materials paid for by Plaintiff and Appellant, Devon D, that
were expended or used in the construction of Defendant and Appellee Nelsons' house,
in addition to those granted by the lower court.
2.

Whether or not the lower court erred in failing to also grant pre-judgment

interest on said sums not granted in the judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of review is one of correctness, giving no particular deference to
the trial court, after marshalling all the evidence supporting the findings, demonstrating
that even if viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings. (Turnbaugh v. Anderson 793 P.2d 939). (Doelle
v. Bradley 784 P.2d 1176)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1(2)
"unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate
of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money...shall be 10% per annum."
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 803(6) Hearsay exceptions; availability of
declarant immaterial.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(6)

Records of regularly conducted activity.
2

A

memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether
or not conducted for profit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is a civil case filed by Devon D to collect money owed by the Nelsons,
and to quiet title to land. Devon D filed an amended complaint on or about January
3,1990 (Rd 150), naming the Nelsons as defendants and also several materialmen and
laborers. The first cause of action against the Nelsons alleged a principal sum of
$56,250.76 due plus interest. The second cause of action alleged that Defendants
Nelsons should hold Devon D harmless from any claims made by the remaining
Defendants Materialmen and Labormen, in the sum of $64,235.00. The third cause of
action alleged that Devon D was the owner of two strips of described land across lots
located in the Cherrywood Estates Subdivision, Provo, Utah, which Nelsons claimed
to own, and for a decree of quiet title. The Nelsons filed a general denial to the
Amended Complaint (Rd 169). No counterclaim or crossclaim was filed, and no third
3

party complaint was filed by the Nelsons. Before the trial the Nelsons had satisfied or
were paying all other materialmen and labormen named, and ultimately satisfied them
in one way or another. No other materialmen or labormen actively participated in the
trial, even though some received stipulated Judgments against the Nelsons. At the trial
the only parties were Devon D, and the Nelsons. The issue of title to the two strips of
land was also settled by stipulation, quieting title to them in Devon D. The remaining
issue was whether or not Nelsons owed any sum of money to Devon D, and if so how
much and what for.
After five days of trial to the bench, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision
dated July 15, 1992, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered
December 28, 1992 (Rd 464, 514).
Devon D appealed the decision of the Court which only awarded it on aggregate
judgment in the sum of $41,069.39, out of a claimed $56,250.76 due, and the trial courts
denial of any prejudgment interest (Rd 521.1). The Nelsons initially appealed, but later
dismissed their cross appeal. This Court's record will also show that the Nelsons filed
a Motion and Suggestion of Mootness, after Devon D attempted to collect the
$41,069.39 by execution and the Nelsons voluntarily paid that sum. This Court denied
the Nelsons Motion and Suggestion, except for prejudgment interest on the $41,069.39.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A summary of the case and resulting Judgment is important for the Court's
4

understanding. The Nelsons purchased or traded for a parcel of land in a Subdivision
in Provo, Utah being developed by Nathan Chappel. Nathan Chappel and the Nelsons
also came to some understanding or agreement to construct a house on the parcel. (Tr
page 10). The initial agreement was apparently oral between the parties. At this time
neither Devon D nor it's owner Gordon Griffin was involved. (Tr 19). Gordon Griffin
lived in the area and also owned some of the development property in the area and was
aware of the Nelson home being constructed. He knew Nathan Chappel, as they also
had had business dealings between them.
Chappel and the Nelsons commenced constructing the house in question, but for
reasons not material to this case they were not able to complete it. (Tr 21). They both
approached Devon D and it's owner Gordon Griffin, for help. Devon D ultimately
assisted financially by paying for some of the labor and materials utilized and ordered
by both Nathan Chappel and the Nelsons in completing the house. Gordon Griffin
expected to be repaid his money when the Nelsons obtained a long term loan on the
house, but was not expecting to make a profit. He thought he was just helping out
neighbors and friends. (Tr 89-99). Numerous materialmen and labormen would
present claims or invoices to Devon D who would issue checks in payment to these
persons, numbering about 104 checks. (Tr 46).
Devon D and its owner Gordon Griffin was in the business of renovating houses
for resale, among other business, at the time. He agreed to help out the financing of the
5

completion of the Nelson house. The business procedure followed by Chappel, the
Nelsons, Gordon Griffin and Devon D's bookkeeper, Pamela Rogers were as follows.
(Tr 33-59). Chappel was generally in charge of supervising the completion of the house.
He ordered materials, scheduled workmen, and performed labor himself. (Tr 251 -276).
Howard Nelson would also order material and instruct workmen from time to time
during the completion of the house. (Tr 290-299). Material and workmen alike were
directed to Devon D, for payment on a regular basis by both Chappel and Nelsons.
Some workmen and materialmen would also work on or supply materials to other
projects being renovated by Devon D. To account for expenditures made for Howard
Nelsons home as opposed to other projects being worked on. Chappel or the workmen
or materialmen would designate the amount of time or material utilized in a requested
payment on the Nelson home and this information was relayed to Pam Rogers and or
Gordon Griffin at the time payment was made. (Tr 33-48; 81-115). Without exception,
Pam Rogers or Gordon Griffin would note on the checks written, just how much of the
payment was attributed to the Nelson home and how much might have been attributed
to other projects, in terms of dollars and cents based on hours spent by labormen or
material utilized in the Nelson home. Again these notations on the checks were based
on information furnished at the time by Chappel, or the materialmen and labormen to
Devon D without exception. (Tr 251-276). This business practice or method of
accounting was followed by everyone in each case in all sums included in the claim by
6

Devon D against the Nelsons, for the total sum of $56,250.76.
At trial Nelsons admitted that 22 checks in the total sum of $15,143.64
represented materials and labor for their home. The trial Court granted Judgment for
these sums plus 42 others, amounting to $25,925.75 based on the evidence.
The Nelsons took possession of the house and moved in during March 1989. (Tr
4). But, they failed and refused to re-pay Devon D for money it had paid out towards
completion of the home. (Transcript page 28). As a result of a survey of the
subdivision, it was determined that the house in question was constructed partially on
real property owned by Devon D (about 30% of the house), the balance of the house
being situated on the parcel previously purchased by the Nelsons. Basically the house
was mis-located when construction was first started by Chappel and the Nelsons.
In some cases checks were made out to Gordon Griffin on Devon D's accounts
signed by Gordon Griffin as president of Devon D. Gordon Griffin testified that these
sums were to reimburse him personally for money he paid out in cash or by credit card
to pay for labor and material expended on the Nelson home. Without exception the
basis for the charges to the Nelson home was noted on the checks as they were written.
In other cases checks were made out to Nate Chappel, or his wife Nila Chappel. Again
without exception the basis for amounts being charged to the Nelson home were noted
on the checks when they were written. Chappel testified these sums were for materials
that went into the Nelson home, with some for labor on Chappels part. The Court
7

denied granting judgment on any of these checks made out to Gordon Griffin or the
Chappels. These denied payments to Gordon Griffin, Nathan Chappel, and Nila
Chappel and others are the basis of this appeal, plus the denial of any prejudgment
interest.
Other checks made out to other materialmen and labormen were denied also by
the Court and these will all be addressed in late argument.
MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE
The following items listed are checks, and amounts claimed by Plaintiff but
denied or not included by the Court in the Judgment. Each exhibit was offered and
received by the Court at page 46 and 718 of the transcript. The trial court did not
affirmatively state why it did not include these amounts:
Exhibit #

Check #

Amount Claimed

Transcript Page

P-1
P-5
P-9a
P-9b
P-11
P-18
P-25
P-27
P-28
P-30
P-34
P-37
P-40
P-42
P-49

288
418
441
445
464
484
502
506
507
513
527
536
545
547
561

$ 111.74
$1,051.00
$1,669.00
$ 404.00
$1,054.00
$ 26.36
$ 293.00
$ 320.00
$ 840.00
$ 360.00
$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$ 40.00
$ 104.00
$ 330.00

273
364
367
367
370
375
377
380
380, 381
383
150, 387
390
392
113,202,203
72, 399
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P-50
P-55
P-59
P-60
P-61
P-68
P-69
P-72
P-73
P-103
P-86
P-91
P-88a
P-77
P-83
P-80
Total

563
579
586
588
599
631
632
663
665
671
0
Z
128
761
343
1011

$ 67.00
$ 26.00
$ 106.00
$ 200.00
$1,075.13
$ 52.50
$ 635.00
$ 60.00
$ 500.00
$ 14.85
$ 107.82
$ 215.82
$ 78.00
$ 111.16
$ 174.50
$ 169.50

72, 399
72, 399
73, 176

408
408
178
183
73,181

413
409
416
186, 187
342, 417, 418
186, 187,203
186, 187
186, 187, 206

$13,196.38

They were thus by implication denied by the Court. In an effort to marshall
evidence supporting the trial courts denial of these amounts the following is offered.
Defendant's counsel called Sharon Nelson and Howard Nelson in their case in
chief. Sharon Nelson testified that she signed blank applications for a long term loan
in November 1988. She furnished information to the mortgage company, Colonial
Mortgage. But the loan was never closed. Howard Nelson testified. He stated he had
an agreement dated June 6,1988 with Nate Chappel to finish the house for $91,000.00,
but that he never had any agreement to borrow or repay money to Devon D - or
Gordon Griffin (ex D-109). Defendant offered several exhibits, through witness
Howard Nelson, involving mechanics liens placed against his house by others, that he
9

was paying on a monthly basis. Howard Nelson also complained about Nathan
Chappel, and the progress of the work on his house over the periods of time in question.
Any other evidence that may be marshalled in support of the courts failure to
include the sums in question in the judgment must be gleaned from cross examination
by Defendant of Plaintiff s witnesses.
Defendant cross examined Nathan Chappel and Gordon Griffin but did not
introduce any testimony or evidence contrary to any of the disallowed checks and
amounts. During cross Defendants' counsel established that Nathan Chappel had told
counsel he had a poor memory from spraying too much lacquer. (Tr 430) Counsel also
attempted to attack Chappels memory by showing him in his deposition where he said
he had received 70-90 thousand dollars from Nelson towards the lots and building the
house, where he said $76,000.00 at the trial. (Tr 437) He also pointed out that Chappel
said it took ninety days to restart the house, in his deposition, where he said eight
months at the trial.
Counsel also cross examined Chappel about Charlie Newbreast and exhibits 24
and 71, but both of those amounts were included in the judgment. (Tr 446) Counsel
Brady cross examined Chappel about exhibit 109, a contract between Nelson and
Chappel concerning the finishing of the house, and about both Mr. Nelson and Chappel
meeting with Mr. Griffin, (tr 448-459), where counsel established that Chappel had
financial difficulties and had taken out bankruptcy. (Tr 465) Counsel established that
10

when supplies were ordered from BMC West it was noted on the invoice or delivery
ticket what job the materials were for, whether by him or some other worker. Also that
Chappel, Gary Young and Wayne Knight worked on other projects besides the Nelson
house. (Tr 489-491) Counsel established that Chappel had helped a David Nelson on
a project during this time and charged some supplies to Devon D's account at BMC
West. (Exhibit 100) (Tr 492-497) (Some items charged to Howard Nelson should have
been charged to David Nelson's job, see transcript page 423, where the Plaintiffs
attorney pointed out the mistake and $1,164.00 was deducted from the claim against
Nelsons because of the mistake.)
Concerning exhibit 1, check #288 to BMC West for $300.00, (Tr 498), Nelsons'
Counsel established that there was no invoice showing how much of the $300.00 was
attributed to the Nelson house, which Devon D showed as $111.74. Chappel stated the
amount was based on his knowledge at the time, and otherwise he had no memory that
served him at the time of the trial, other than what he believed from looking at the
check. (Tr 273, Chappel indicated the $111.74 was BMC West material for the Nelson
home).
Concerning exhibit 5, (Tr 500), Counsel established that payee on check #418
for $1,051.00 was an attorney and he was paid to satisfy a lien, apparently on the
Nelson home. (The check notation recites it was for roofing the house per Howard
Nelson and Chappel said it was for roofing the Nelson home, Tr 364.)
11

Concerning exhibit 9a and 9b, page 503, check #441 for $1669.00 to Nila
Chappel and #455 for $404.00 to Nate Chappel, Counsel established that Chappel said
he didn't know what they were for on direct, but indicated on cross that they were for
payments made to Mike Ullerton for television and telephone access, and to Carl
Clements for doing roofing. (Chappel said it was to reimburse his wife's business,
Aspen Interiors, and himself for labor and materials they had paid for and that were
used in the Nelson house, Tr 367.)
Concerning exhibit #11 (Tr 507), Counsel established that it was possible that
the payment on check #464 to AM FAC Electric for $1,054.48 was for subdivision
expenses. (Chappel said it was for electrical supplies for the Nelson house, Tr 370-371.)
Concerning exhibit #16 (Tr 510), it was established that Chappel thought the
check #481 to John Adams for $313.65 was for subdivision work and not Howard
Nelson's house. (The amount and check was not offered by Plaintiff or included in
judgment and is not claimed in this appeal, Tr 374.)
Concerning exhibit # 18, (Tr 510-511). Check #484 and a charge of $26.36 to the
Nelson house, Counsel established that black ink and red ink writing were on two
different copies of the invoices attached, and Chappel didn't know why or who did the
writing. (Chappel said it was for insulation material used in the Nelson home, Tr 375.)
Concerning exhibit #25 check #502, (Tr 513), Counsel established that $293.00
was paid to Chappel on the Nelson house, but that there was no invoice. Chappel
12

believed he knew at the time it was for labor and so testified. (Chappel said it was for
a permit or fee to Provo City, that he had paid on the Nelson house and he was being
reimbursed, Tr 377-378.)
It was also established that payments to Chappel for "Nate's Bond" meant work
done to get the bond released, page 514, but charges to "Nate's Bond" were not on
expense against Nelsons' house, only the $293.00 for a permit was, though Chappel
didn't remember just what it was. Chappel explained that bonds need to be posted with
Provo City, apparently to guarantee that work would be done on the project and when
the work was done the bond was released. Thus notations to "Nates Bond" were not
charged to the Nelson house, but were payments to Chappel when he did work towards
satisfying the bond requirement.
Concerning exhibit #27, a check #506 to Tom Green for $320, page 514 ,
Counsel established that Tom Green or his wife may have done cleaning on the Nelson
home. (Chappel had said maybe he had done a rain gutter on the Nelson house or other
work or labor, but he was not sure, or he could have done cleaning with his wife, Tr
380.)
Concerning exhibit #28, a check to Wayne Knight, #507 for $840.00, Counsel
established that it was not accompanied by an invoice from Wayne. But sometimes
invoices never got to Devon D's bookkeeper, Pam. (Tr 516) (Chappel said Wayne
Knight worked on the Nelson house doing all kinds of work, and turned in his time on
13

the Nelson house. (Tr 380,381. See also Wayne's testimony Tr 604-626.)
Concerning exhibit #34, a check to Nila Chappel, Counsel established that it was
made out to Rite Cabinets, but Chappel changed it to Nila Chappel's name as payee.
Concerning P-30, (Tr 516), Counsel established that sometimes Keith Lewis' time
sheets did not get turned into Pam, and Pam would rely on Chappel's word. (Chappel
said Keith Lewis did much of the finish work on the Nelson house, Tr 383,384.)
Concerning exhibit #37, payable to Nathan Chappel for $1,500.00, and charge
to the Nelson house, Counsel established that Chappel believed it went for plumbing
and other supplies he purchased for the Nelson house, although it was an even amount
and said plumbing fittings and doors, page 518,519. (Chappel said it was to reimburse
him for plumbing supplies he paid for used by Max Brown to plumb the Nelson house,
Tr391.)

Concerning P-42, (Tr 202,203) Counsel established that the check to Griffin was
to reimburse him for Louis' labor in the sum of $104.00, that there was no invoice
(Louis was a Spanish person who couldn't use a check so Griffin paid him cash an
collected by reimbursement from Devon D). (Tr 181-183; Tr 178.)
Concerning exhibit #49, (Tr 520), a check for $330.00 to Nathan Chappel,
Counsel established that Chappel got the money for work he did on the Nelson house
because he needed it. Otherwise he probably was working for free. (Chappel said he
14

worked on the Nelson house and was paid some, (Tr 399 and Tr 273), but otherwise
worked for free.
Concerning P-50, check number 563, to Gordon Griffin represented
reimbursement for supplies used in the Nelson house totalling $67.00.
Concerning P-55, check number 579, it was paid to Gordon Griffin to reimburse
him for $26.00 paid out on the Nelson house, to Louis for labor. (See Tr 181-183; Tr
178)
Concerning P-59, check number 586 reimbursed Gordon Griffin $106.00 for cash
paid out to Louis for labor on the Nelson house. (Tr 177-178) Gordon had noted on
Louis' time slip how much was on Nelson's house.
Concerning exhibit #60, a check to Chappel for $200.00, page 523, Counsel
established that Chappel needed the money but maybe there was an agreement that he
work for free. (Tr 273 and 399; Tr 408)
Concerning exhibit #61, (Tr 523 and 524), a check for $1,057.13 for labor,
Counsel established Chappel thought it was to reimburse him for materials he
purchased and wages he paid out on the Nelson house. (Chappel said he purchased
materials for the Nelson house and then would be reimbursed when Gordon was not
around to pay, Tr 408-409.)
Concerning exhibit #68, a check to Robert Matt, page 525, Counsel established
that Matt was paid $52.50 for roof work and clean up, when others that had done
15

shingle replacement work were not paid. (Griffin said Robert Matt did roof repair
work, Tr 178.)
Concerning exhibit 69, a check to Aspen Interiors for $635.00 (Tr 183,184,185),
Counsel established that Aspen Interiors belonged to Nila Chappel and the money was
paid to reimburse for plumbing Matt Brown had done on the Nelson's house.
Concerning P-72, check number 663, Counsel established it was a $60.00
reimbursement to Gordon Griffin for Louis' labor, (Tr 181).
Concerning exhibit #73, a check for $500.00 to Keith Lewis, (Tr 528), Counsel
established that it said "Nate's Bond" on the check, but that it was for hardwood
flooring on the Nelson's home, (finishing) and had nothing to do with the bond.
The remainder of the cross examination of Nathan Chappel involved his dealings
with Nelson and the subdivision prior to Devon D being involved, and the contract,
exhibit 109, he signed, as it related to liens of other labormen and materialmen.
Contrary to the marshalled evidence produced by the Nelsons' direct evidence,
and cross examination, Devon D'sevidence established that concerning exhibit number
77, check number 761 drawn on the account of Devon D signed by Gordon D. Griffin
mad e payable to Farmers Insurance Group in the amount of $ 111.16 for construction
insurance on the Howard W. nelson home with accompanying invoice. (Tr 203,186188.)
Concerning exhibit number 80, check number 1011 drawn on the account of
16

Devon D signed by Gordon Griffin made payable to Farmers Insurance Group in the
amount of $169.50 for insurance on the Nelson home. (Tr 186-188.)
Concerning exhibit number 83, check number 343, drawn on the account of
Devon D signed by Gordon GrifTm made payable to Farmer's Insurance Group in the
amount of $174.50 for Insurance on the Nelson house. (Tr 186-188.)
Concerning exhibit number 86, check number 0 drawn on the account of Devon
D signed by Gordon Griffin made payable to Nila Chappel for $107.82 to reimburse
Nila Chappel for a reducer and payment to Max Brown for a water hook-up. (Tr 416417.)
Concerning exhibit number 88a, check number 128 drawn on the account of
Devon D signed by Gordon Griffin made payable to Gary young in the amount of
$318.00, with $78.00 for labor on the Nelson house. (Tr 342, 417-418.)
Concerning exhibit number 91, check #Z drawn on the account of Devon D,
signed by Gordon D. Griffin made payable to Rick Lee Insurance in the amount of
$486.00, which includes construction insurance in the amount of $215.00 for the
Howard W. Nelson home. Devon D purchased fire insurance on the Nelson home so
there would be a fund to pay him back if the house was destroyed. (Tr 186-188.)
Concerning exhibit number P-103, check number 671, drawn on the account of
Devon D, signed by Gordon D. Griffin made payable to BMC West in the amount of
$119.54 which includes $14.85 of building materials used in the construction of the
17

Nelson home. Nathan Chappel corrected the amount charged to the Nelson home after
reviewing the invoices attached. (Tr 429.)
ARGUMENT I
The Court received all of the checks with supporting invoices or documents
where attached, as evidence under Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, with the
provision that the Plaintiff needed to substantiate the amounts and the labor and
materials as being incorporated into the Nelson house. That effort then filled up most
of the time spent at trial. (See page 46-47 of the transcript.)
The Court will note that the amounts of the checks are sometimes for more than
was attributed to the Nelson house. That is because in most cases the worker or
materialman was also furnishing labor or material at other project houses for Devon D.
The Court will also note that on each check without exception there are
notations in the left hand corner showing the amount applicable to the Nelson house
construction project, and usually what the money was spent on.
Thus, Devon D had a bookkeeping system or method to separate the money
spent on each project. The Defendant Nelsons' case or defense centered around
attaching the veracity of Nathan Chappel and Gordon Griffin.
The Plaintiffs witness Gordon Griffin and Pamela Rogers described the business
process followed when all the checks were issued to pay for labor and material that went
into the Nelson home. She was the only bookkeeper that kept the records for Devon
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D. Her job was to collect the information about what materials and labor went into the
different projects. (Tr 35-45) She followed the standard practice of writing on the
checks that concerned the Nelson house, the amount attributed to the Nelson house
project. She obtained that information from invoices, and directions from Chappel and
Griffin. And in some cases from workmen themselves. The information was gathered
at the time or prior to when the checks were written.
Gordon Griffin testified of the same business practice, (Tr 109-112)
Nathan Chappel's role in the project was varied. Initially he was the developer
of the subdivision, and the contract builder for Howard Nelson. After the project fell
on hard times financially, and he and Nelson solicited help from Devon D, or Gordon
Griffin, Nathan Chappel became more of a supervisor of construction for Nelson in an
effort to get the house done for Nelson, and to get himself out of a bind with Howard
Nelson. (Tr 430-488). Even after Nathan Chappel was not able to complete the house
under his original agreement with Howard Nelson, Nelson still wanted Chappel to
complete the house. Gordon Griffin tried to get Nelson to get another contractor to
finish the house, but Nelson refused. (Transcript page 92). It is respectfully submitted
that Nelson made Chappel his agent in dealing with labormen, materialmen, and
Gordon Griffin in order to get the house completed.
Nathan Chappel was then the one to supervise and direct the finishing of the
house for the Nelsons after Devon D started paying for labor and materials that went
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into the house. Chappel was the one who was there all the time, directing the
construction. He knew what materials went into the house and what laborers worked
on the house. Nathan Chappel testified at the trial concerning the exhibits in an effort
to substantiate the labor and material noted on the checks as being in fact utilized in the
house. (Tr 251-276; 346-430).
The Plaintiff called other witnesses who were materialmen or laborers that were
available. They included Darrell Cottam, (Tr 290-300); Gary Young (Tr 300-318; 331);
Carl W. Crawford (Tr 469-473); Earl Carter (Tr 474-478); Ronald Critchfield (Tr 542551); Rick Johnson (Tr 552-558; 558-560); L.R. Johnson (Tr 559); Gary Mackey (Tr
579-586); Lex Norris (Tr 587-594; 596-598); Wayne S. Knight (Tr 604-618; 626).
As a result the Court allowed and granted judgment in the principal sum of
$41,069.39 out of all of the checks or claimed amounts, but disallowed the checks listed
above totaling $13,196.38.
Even though these checks were disallowed by the trial court, Plaintiff argues that
they should have been allowed even after marshalling all of Defendants evidence in
favor of the lower courts denial, because the same business record keeping system
supported them, that supported those that were allowed.
ARGUMENT II
There are two undisputed items of evidence that the Court should note. The
complaint alleges a principal sum due of $56,250.76. The Nelsons' main defense was
20

that they didn't owe Devon D anything because they had no agreement with Devon D.
They argued that their agreement was with Nathan Chappel (exhibit 109). But, the
evidence mentioned shows that at all times the Nelsons understood that they owed
Devon D or Gordon Griffin for the completion work done on the house after Nathan
Chappel was not able to finish it. The Court's attention is called to Plaintiff's exhibit
#122, and pages 661-678 of the transcript. Exhibit 122 is a financial statement which
was signed by Sharon Nelson on behalf of her and her husband Howard Nelson, on
November 12, 1988. This was long after Devon D and Gordon Griffin had become
involved in financing and finishing the house. As part of their liability on exhibit 122,
and in fact the only major one, the Nelsons listed owing Gordon Griffin the sum of
$120,235.00, on a real estate loan. The debt was listed as "to be paid". The Nelsons also
listed the house in question as an asset worth $202,000.00 with a lien of $ 125,235.00, the
exact figure owing Gordon Griffin. It is absolutely obvious that the Nelsons knew
Gordon Griffin was financing the finishing of their home and at that time they
recognized him as a creditor and expected to pay him. In exhibit 122 the Nelsons did
not list Nathan Chappel as a creditor, nor did they list lien holders that predated the
financial statement. (See D-exhibits 127,134, 135, 136, and 137.) It is obvious from
these facts that the Nelsons considered Gordon Griffin and his company Devon D their
interim construction financier, and expected to satisfy all materialmen and labormen
through a payment to him.
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The Nelsons also knew on June 6, 1988 when Howard Nelson initialed the
contract, exhibit 109, that they were was expected to pay Devon D. It was only after
the fact, and when their expected long term mortgage fell through for what ever reason,
the Nelsons decided to not pay Gordon Griffin and try to claim they did not owe him
at all.
Devon D's claim of $52,250.76 and proof of $56,426.38 is well within the debt
the Nelsons acknowledged owing Gordon Griffin in exhibit 122, and regardless of any
other evidence, the judgment should have been for the full amount claimed and proved
by Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT III
In spite of the marshalled evidence, and particularly the cross examination of
Nathan Chappel, the evidence supports a judgment for the full amount of Plaintiffs
claim, based on the business records rule. Pursuant to Rule 803(6), the Court allowed
the checks and invoices, where attached, as business records kept in the regular course
of business, all of them qualified for admission under the rule. (Transcript pages 46-48)
The checks themselves are the important business record because they were used to
memorialize the amount of money spent on the Nelson home and create a record, at the
time the expenditures were made. Without exception, that system was followed by Pam
Rogers, and Gordon Griffin in recording at the time, based on information available
at the time, the amount attributed to the Nelson home. Those checks, are the most
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reliable direct evidence available showing the amounts expended on the Nelson home
by Devon D. Most are also backed up with invoices or other basic information showing
how the break down and assignment to the Nelson home was made.
The Court's apparent acceptance ofcross examination of Nathan Chappel's and
Gordon Griffin's current memory at the time of trial, some four years after the events,
as discrediting and nullifying the clear evidence written on the checks rejected, is
arbitrary and capricious. This is particularly so where the record keeping system was
accepted by the Court to establish judgment for $41,069.39 of the amount claimed, but
rejecting $13,196.38 of the claim which was based on the same record keeping practices.
The Nelsons themselves accepted $15,143.64 of the claim by stipulation which was
based on that same record keeping system. There simply was no justification for the
Court to accept the record keeping system as evidence supporting most of the claims,
and then disallow $13,196.38 of the claimed amount from the judgment.
Primarily the Court disallowed sums that were paid by Devon D to Gordon
Griffin as reimbursements for money he paid out of other accounts or cash he had. And
the Court disallowed all monies paid to Nathan Chappel and Nila Chappel. The Court
disallowed these amounts by implication only without stating in the Memorandum
Decision or the Findings of Fact just why the Court did not allow payments to these
people, or did not accept the records and checks as proof of the claims. Apparently the
Court thought these claims were dishonest or unreliable, without there being any
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evidence supporting that assumption. In every exhibit made payable to Gordon Griffin,
Nathan Chappel and Nila Chappel, the amounts were explained and justified by the
invoices attached or the explanation given at trial, and they were consistently justified
on the face of the checks like those that were allowed.
ARGUMENT IV
The trial court did not grant any pre-judgment interest on any of the sums paid
out by Devon D. The court found in it's Judgment at "Conclusion of Laws #7" that by
reason of the equitable nature of the case, no pre-judgment interest was allowed. In
Davies v Olson 746 P.2d 264, this Court of Appeals considered a similar construction
lawsuit, and the question of pre-judgment interest as well as quantum meruit, quasicontract or contract implied in law, and unjust enrichment issues. This Court said:
"Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. Both
branches, however, or rooted in "justice" to prevent the
defendant's enrichment at the plaintiff's expense."
Thus a quantum meruit case is an equitable case or a means of providing justice.
This Court in Davies v Olson readily found that the recovering Plaintiff was entitled to
prejudgmentinterestunderU.C.A.§15-l-l at the rate of 10%. Under the Davies v Olson
case, Devon D is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest also on it's claim. Nelsons
moved into the home in March of 1989 (Finding of Fact #13, Rd. 514), and interest
should start to run on at least that date at 10% per annum until the date of judgment.
Since this case also concerns the expenditure of actual cash money, the amount
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< • ; ;-jjudgment can be readily calci Uatedandpre iiu le n iei it i nterest is allowable i inder
the principals discussed in Shoreline Development (. -, -: UtahJCmin]^835P.2d207,in
spite of the lower courts finding. This is particularly so where Devon D's complaint
specifically prayed for prejudgment interest, and it is clear that the trial court's
judgment did not include any factorforinterest. (See Fritzgerald v Critchfield 744 P 2d
i

CONCLUSION
Devon D paid for labor and materials that were used to complete a house for the
Nelsons, after the Nelsons and their contractor were not able to complete the house.
Devon D had no written agreement, with the Nelsons to do so, but had discussed the
arrangement with I low a i d Nelson and N a than Chappel. Believ ing there was an
understanding, Devon D paid materialment and labormen as bills or requests were
submitted, and recorded the amounts applicable to the Nelson house on the relevant
checks as they were written. Based on the checks received into evidence and stipulation
of the Nelsons, theCoui I: granted Judgment against the N elsonsandi n favor of Devon
1) in the sum of $41,069,39, and denied Devon D any prejudgment interest.
Devon D seeks judgement of this Court granting the balance of it's claim against
the Nelsons in the sum of $13,196.38 based on the evidence presented at the trial
contrary to the lower court's apparentfindingthat the balance of the claims had not
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claim not awarded by the trial court.
DATED this

7-T

day of April, 1994.

DEXT^R-CTANDERSON
Attorney ror Plaintiff
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NONE
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Both parties appeal from the trial court's May 17, 1985 judgment
inst defendant Olson, purporting to award plaintiffs their reasonable
ts (plus interest) incurred in constructing four duplexes for defendants,
affirm the trial court's finding that there was no contract, and the
rt's conclusion that quantum meruit was, therefore, the proper theory of
overy. We, however, reverse the finding of no liability on the part of
endant Lund. We remand for findings as to whether he (1) requested
intiffs to perform work and if so, to what extent, and/or (2) received any
efits as a result of plaintiffs' construction of the duplexes, and an
gaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, TPage 1
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entry of a judgment consistent with those findings and our opinion. We
further reverse the trial court's calculation of damages against defendant
Olson and remand for a determination of the reasonable value of plaintiffs'
services in constructing the duplexes, and an entry of a judgment in that
amount against defendant Olson.
FACTS
The following facts were developed in a bifurcated trial held on five
nonconsecutive days over a two-year eight-month period. [1] Plaintiff Davies
and defendant Olson orally agreed that Davies would construct four duplexes
for Olson. The parties originally agreed that plaintiff Davies would
construct the duplexes for "cost plus $6,000 builder's profit per duplex."
Based on this oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost breakdown and
submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of long-term financing, and to
defendant Olson. Subsequently, defendant Olson requested numerous changes
and additions to the original specifications for the duplexes.
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an attempt to establish a ceiling price
on the cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex, prepared a contract and
submitted it to plaintiffs. In his letter to plaintiffs, defendant Olson
stated that the purpose of the proposed contract was "mainly to satisfy
[defendant] Lund" as he was concerned about fixing a ceiling price. This
contract, however, was never executed.
A settlement statement, dated July 7, 1981 and signed by defendant Lund,
fixed the contract sales price at $128,500. This settlement statement was
used at the closing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank provided permanent
financing, which was insufficient to cover plaintiffs' construction expenses.
Consequently, plaintiffs initiated an action against, among others,
defendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims of fraud, breach of contract, and
foreclosure of mechanics' liens. (The foreclosure claim was resolved).
After the initial trial on August 2, 1982 and September 13, 1982, the
trial court entered judgment on August 4, 1983 against defendants Lund and
Olson for $23,741.54 [2] plus 12% interest accruing from July 7, 1981. The
court found there was no agreement among the parties as to the total price to
be paid for the construction of the duplexes. The court, however, based on
the initial cost breakdown prepared by plaintiff Davies, found defendants
jointly liable for $23,741.54. The court then found that plaintiffs were
additionally entitled to recover from defendant Olson the reasonable costs
incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes in the duplex
specifications. [3] The court then directed counsel to negotiate and submit
a figure as to the reasonable costs plaintiffs incurred because of defendant
Olson's requested changes. The parties failed to reach an agreement.
Consequently, a supplemental hearing was held on April 4, 1985, April 10,
1985, and April 16, 1985, focusing on the following issues previously
reserved by the trial court:
1. What were the plans and specifications upon which plaintiffs and
LegaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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endants relied i n the cost break down?
2. What modifications were subsequently made to those plans and
cifications upon defendant Olson's re quests?
3. What were the reasonable costs of the requested modifications which
e actually made by plaintiffs?
T h e trial court, in its final judgment of May ] 7, 3 985, found there was
meeting of the minds between the parties "as to p] ans and specifications
ch formed the basis of the cost breakdown," and, therefore, that it erred
basing its August 4, 1983 judgment on that document. The court concluded
t in order to prevent unjust enrichment of defendant Olson, plaintiffs
B entitled to recover their reasonable costs of construction from him. The
rt, however, was silent as to defendant Lund's liability. The court
rded plaintiffs $51,773.96 plus interest "at the legal rate of interest,"
ruing from July 7, 1981, the date the settlement statement was executed,
trial court calculated the May 17, 1985 judgment as follows:

sonable cost of construction
$366,703.96 Less adjustment for water
1,350.00 NET CONSTRUCTION COST
3 65,353.96 Less
Sirs
Amount of the August 4 Judgment [4]
313,580.00 May 1 7, 1985 Judgment
Plaintiffs

$51,773.96

ti parties appeal from the May 17, 1985 judgment.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, we are asked to determine whether there is sufficient
ience to support the trial court's finding of no enforceable written or
L contract. The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside
5ss "clearly erroneous." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d
(Utah Ct.App.1987); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). A
Lew of the record amply supports the trial court's findings (1) that there
no meeting of the minds as to the contract price, an essential term of a
struction contract; (2) that there was no meeting of the minds as to which
is and specifications formed the basis of the cost breakdown prepared by
Lntiff Davies; and (3) that the parties cii d not i ntend the settlement
bement to constitute an executory accord.
Testimony at ti ial conflicted significantly as to the contract price.
Lntiff Davies testified that he and defendant Olson orally agreed that
Lntiff Davies would construct the four duplexes for cost plus $6,000
Lder's profit per duplex. Defendant Olson, on the other hand, while
ceding that cost plus $6,000 was discussed, denied that he agreed to an
i-ended deal. Subsequent to the oral conversation between plaintiff
Les and defendant olson, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost breakdown and
nitted it to Wasatch Bank and to defendant Olson. Thereafter, defendant
Dn prepared a written contract with a provision that cost was not to
sed $72,070 per duplex, evidently attempting to appease defendant Lund's
zem about cost. Defendant Olson presented this proposed contract to
jaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. ] 991, 92, 93, 94
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plaintiff Davies, claiming Davies said that he would sign it. This contract,
however, was never executed.
Given the disparity in the testimony regarding the contract price, the
trial court's finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to the
contract price is not clearly erroneous.
We also affirm the trial court's finding that the settlement statement
used for closing on the financing did not constitute an "executory accord,"
because there was no meeting of the minds. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v.
Mantas, 699 p.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson,
610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). The settlement statement lists the contract
(Utah App, 1987) price as $128,500. At trial, conflicting testimony was
introduced regarding whether defendant Olson ever agreed to this figure.
Defendant Olson testified that he never agreed to a contract price in excess
of $116,000 per unit. Similarly, defendant Lund's position is that he signed
the settlement statement merely to assist defendant Olson to acquire longterm financing, but that the settlement statement did not constitute an
acknowledgment of specific amounts owed to plaintiffs. After reviewing the
record, we do not believe the trial court's finding that the parties did not
intend the settlement statement to constitute an executory accord is clearly
erroneous.
II. DUE PROCESS
Defendants contend that they were denied due process of law because the
trial court's May 17, 1985 judgment was based on quantum meruit, a theory
which was not pled, nor reserved by the trial court. We disagree.
A hearing must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs
the parties of the specific issues they must be prepared to meet. Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). Issues not expressly raised in
the pleadings, however, may be tried by the implied consent of the parties.
General Ins# Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976).
Implied consent may be found where evidence is introduced without objection.
Id. Moreover, proof of a quasi-contract under an allegation of a breach of an
express contract does not violate due process, absent surprise or prejudice.
North Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v. Great American Ins. Co., 46 Or.
App. 173, 611 P.2d 319, 321 (1980).
Quantum meruit was, at least inferentially, an issue at the
supplemental hearing. The supplemental hearing focused on the plans and
specifications underlying the cost breakdown and the additional costs
plaintiffs incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes in the
duplex specifications. There is no showing that defendants were surprised or
prevented from presenting all evidence pertaining to the reasonable costs of
construction or the benefits defendants received, nor that they were
prejudiced by the trial judge relying on the theory of quantum meruit.
Furthermore, any possible prejudice defendants may have suffered is cured by
our remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.
LegaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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III.DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY
i trial court, in its final May 17, 1985 judgment, without any supportive
idings or explanation, relieved defendant Lund of liability. The court did
.s although it had previously held him liable for the $23,741.54 judgment,
are unable to ascertain whether the court found that defendant Lund
[uested plaintiffs to perform services, and if so, to what extent, or
ither any benefit was conferred upon defendant Lund by plaintiffs'
istruction of the duplexes. If defendant Lund requested services and
;eived a benefit which would be unjustly retained, he is liable under
ntum meruit. [5] Consequently, we remand to the trial court for findings
this issue and an entry of judgment consistent with our opinion.
IV.MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Despite our approval of the trial court's decision to base recovery on
ntum meruit, we, nonetheless, reverse the May 17, 1985 judgment because we
d that it is legally and factually inconsistent.
In its August 4, 1983 judgment, the trial court based plaintiffs'
ages on the cost breakdown and held both defendants liable.
In its May 17, 1985 judgment, the court determined that there was no
ting of the minds as to the plans and specifications underlying the cost
akdown, reversing its prior conclusion. The court, therefore, premised
May 17, 1985 judgment strictly on quantum meruit. Nonetheless, in
culating the measure of damages assessed against defendant Olson, the
rt gave defendant Olson credit for the August 4, 1983 judgment-a judgment
ed on a theory that the court had rejected. Further, the court did not
icate whether defendant Lund was still bound by the earlier judgment
ered against him. By giving defendant Olson credit for the August 4, 1983
gment, an earlier judgment which the May 17, 1985 judgment, on its face,
ms to supersede, the trial court, in effect, reduced the amount of
intiffs' recovery. The trial court did not indicate whether it intended
May 17, 1985 judgment to be in addition to the August 4, 1983 judgment,
instead of it. [6] In light of these observations, we find that the May
1985 judgment is internally inconsistent and, if enforced, patently
air to plaintiffs under any interpretation of the evidence. Therefore, we
erse and remand for a determination of damages under quantum meruit.
Because we remand for further proceedings, we attempt to provide some
dance to the trial court. See Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts,
P.2d 154, 158 (Utah 1987). Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a
intiff to recover payment for labor performed in a variety of
cumstances in which that plaintiff, for some reason, would not be able to
on an express contract. Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that
enforceable written or oral contract exists. See Blue Ridge Sewer
rovement Dist. v. Lowry & Assos., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373, 718 P.2d 1026 (Ct.
.1986). Confusion surrounds the use and application of quantum meruit, see,
., Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.1978) (attempting to
jaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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apply Idaho law); Hartwell Corp, v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct.App.
1984), because courts have used the terms quantum meruit, contract implied in
fact, contract implied in law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and/or
restitution without analytical precision. See, eg., Euramca Ecosys v.
Roediger Pittsburgh, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 415, 422 (E.D.111.1984) (discussing
quasi-contract claim in quantum meruit litigation); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v.
Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647, 655-57 (Ct.App.1985); Sharp v.
Laubersheimer, 347 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn.1984); Ellis-Jones, Inc. v. Western
Waterproofing Co., 66 N.C.App. 641, 64647, 312 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1984).
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. Both branches, however, are
rooted in lfjustice," see Lakeshore Fin. Corp. v. Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426,
429 (W.D.Mich.1984), to prevent the defendants enrichment at the plaintiff's
expense. See Hazelwood Water Dist. v. First Union Management, Inc., 78 Or.App.
226, 715 P.2d 498 (1986).
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract is not a
contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1 A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 19, at 44, 46 (1963). The elements of a quasicontract, or a contract implied in law, are: (1) the defendant received a
benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3)
under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the
benefit without paying -or it. See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557
(Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust enrichment"). The measure of recovery
under quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, is the value of the benefit
conferred on the defendant (the defendant7s gain) and not the detriment
incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687
(Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services.
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum meruit. A
contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 comment a (1981). The elements of a
contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the plaintiff to
perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or
her for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that
the plaintiff expected compensation. See Kintz v. Read, 28 Wash.App. 731,
626 P.2d 52, 55 (1981); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5
comment a (1981) (providing that terms of promise or agreement are those
expressed in language of parties or implied in fact from other conduct); 1 S.
Williston, Williston on Contracts 3, at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied in
fact contracts as obligations arising from mutual agreement and intent to
promise where parties do not express agreement and promise in words); 1 A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 18 (1963) (noting that implied contracts impose
contractive duty by reason of promissory expression and are no different than
express contracts, although different in mode of expressing assent).
"Technically, recovery in contract implied in fact is the amount the parties
intended as the contract price. If that amount is unexpressed, courts will
infer that the parties intended the amount to be the reasonable market value
of the plaintiffs services." Kovacie, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit
LegaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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:igation, 35 Am.U.L. Rev. 547, 556 (1986).
In the case before us, the trial court correctly found that there was
express contract, and thus that plaintiffs' recovery must be based on
intum meruit. The court further held that plaintiffs should recover their
.sonable costs of constructing the duplexes. The court correctly found a
itract implied in fact. It is undisputed that defendant Olson orally
;uested plaintiff Davies to construct the duplexes, that plaintiffs
•ected Olson to compensate them for those services, and that Olson knew
t plaintiffs expected compensation. Thus, we remand as to defendant Olson
a determination of the reasonable value of plaintiffs7 services in
structing the duplexes, and an entry of judgment against him for that
unt.
We are unable to determine what the court found as to defendant Lund,
s we remand as to defendant Lund for findings on whether he requested
intiffs to perform work, and if so, to what extent, or whether he received
unjust benefits as 270 Utah 746 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES a result of
intiffs' efforts. These findings will support the court's conclusion as
whether defendant Lund is liable to plaintiffs under quantum meruit-a
tract implied in law, or quantum meruit -a contract implied in fact, or
ther. As is explained more fully supra, the measure of damages may differ
ending on the theory adopted.
V. INTEREST
In awarding damages, the applicable legal rate of interest must also be
ermined. The 1981 amendment to section 15-1-1 increased the legal rate of
erest from 6 percent to 10 percent. Utah Code Ann. 15-1-1 (1986) .
The statutory legal rate of interest is applied from the date payment
due to the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah
9)The trial court found July 7, 1981, the date defendant Lund signed the
tlement statement, as the due date, as that was the date the benefit was
£ erred • It was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an
igation to pay plaintiffs for their services in constructing the duplexes,
find that this determination is supported by substantial evidence and
refore will not disturb it on appeal. See id at 810. Based on this
tual determination, we find the appropriate rate of interest is 10 percent.
The May 17, 1985 judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
a is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each
ty to bear its own costs.
FOOTNOTES:
FOOTNOTES:

— —
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L. The first trial was held on August 2, 1982 and September 13, 1982. the
supplemental hearing was held on April 4, 1985. April 10, 1985, and April 16,
L985. The confusion and inconsistencies in the judgment are largely
attributable to the unfortunate interruptions in the trial
2. The court found the cost per duplex to be $78,395. Multiplying that
figure by the number of duplexes built (4), and subtracting the construction
sosts paid by defendants, $289,838.46, yielded a judgment in the amount of
$23,741.54.
3. The court did not enter judgment against defendant Lund for this
additional recovery, finding that defendant Lund merely assisted defendant
Olson in acquiring long-term financing
4. The court credited defendant Olson with payment of $78,395 per duplex,
multiplied by the number of duplexes built (4), or $313,580. See Note 2,
supra.
5. Of course, the court, on remand, could find other theories of recovery
against defendant Lund based upon the evidence, including partnership or
joint venture.
6. The earlier judgment was not made final pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b)
and therefore would seem to be legally merged into or superseded by the May
17 final judgment.
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eCite: CRITCHFIELD
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
INTIFF AND RESPONDENT

V.

BS Fitzgerald

DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
Gale Critchfield

ED: 10/08/1987
KET NO.: 860041-CA
RK: Mary T. Noonan
JUSTICES:
CONCURRING
=»nwood P.T., J.
Ldson, R.C., J,

DISSENTING
NONE

ABSTAINING
NONE

¥ION AUTHORED BY: JACKSON, Norman H., J.

Defendant Critchfield appeals a judgment of the Fourth Judicial District
:t that awarded plaintiff Fitzgerald $11,367.50, plus interest and costs,
on an oral contract for feeding defendant's livestock. We affirm and
md.
In late 1982, the parties discussed a deal whereby Fitzgerald would feed
care for Critchfield's cattle. Fitzgerald testified that they agreed to
lily $1.00 per head rate, while Critchfield claimed that they agreed to a
dollar amount per ton of hay consumed. Critchfield delivered cattle to
sgerald in December and paid $3,000.00 on his account in February. On
L1 8, Critchfield surreptitiously removed some of his cattle without
.ng his accrued feed bill. On April 19, he picked up the remaining cattle.
Also in late 1982, but apparently prior to the time when these parties'
.is against each other arose, Fitzgerald had filed a Chapter 11 Business
rganization
Petition under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 301 et seq.
f
9) t and had a confirmed plan of reorganization in effect. No trustee was
>inted; instead, Fitzgerald was allowed to continue conducting his
.ness affairs as a debtor in possession, 11 U.S.C. 1107 (Supp.1987), i.
as trustee of his estate for the benefit of his creditors.
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Fitzgerald sued Critchfield on July 18, 1983 in state court for the
Jinpaid feed bill and related claims. Critchfield then counterclaimed for
contract breach and cattle conversion. Fitzgerald obtained a prejudgment
i/rit of attachment on August 25, 1983, commanding the Utah County Sheriff to
"attach and safely keep" forty-six beef cows and calves owned by Critchfield.
\fter the required hearing on the attachment, the lower court ordered
Fitzgerald to post a $25,000.00 bond for the writ to remain in force, but
permitted Critchfield to obtain release of his cattle by posting a $14,000.00
bond. On September 16, Northwestern National Insurance Company (Northwestern)
filed an Undertaking on Discharge of Attachment in the amount of $14,000.00
for "payment to the plaintiff of such sum [sic] may be recovered against the
Defendant.11 The obligation was conditioned only on the release and return to
defendant of his cattle, which occurred shortly after the filing of
Northwestern's bond.
The parties thereafter proceeded to conduct a bench trial on March 22,
1984. The trial judge made and entered the following findings:
On or about December 16, 1982, plaintiff and defendant entered into an
agreement whereby plaintiff would provide feed for the cattle of defendant
and defendant would pay therefore [sic] at the rate of $1.00 per head, per
day.
Plaintiff has fully performed all acts and conditions required to be
performed by him under said agreement.
Defendant has refused and failed to abide by said agreement in that he has
failed to pay the sum of $11,367.50 which is the sum which is due and owing
under said agreement.
Defendant's Counterclaim is not supported by adequate evidence and such
evidence as was offered was of a highly speculative nature.
Judgment for Fitzgerald was entered on April 23, 1984. Defendant's
subsequent motion to amend the judgment was denied. On July 3, defendant
filed a motion to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction due to
plaintiff's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pending when this suit was filed.
Plaintiff then served an order to show cause on Northwestern because of its
refusal to pay on its undertaking. On July 30, an affidavit and memorandum
in opposition to the show cause order were filed by attorneys on behalf of
Northwestern, also urging a lack of state court jurisdiction. Northwestern
appeared by its attorneys at the show cause hearing on July 31. The lower
court held that it had jurisdiction to render judgment and that
Northwestern's bond "was intended to guarantee any judgment recovered by
plaintiff against defendant." Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment
was denied.
During the pendency of this appeal, Critchfield filed a petition for"
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 21, 1984. On April 24, 1986, the
bankruptcy court ordered the proceedings converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
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tchfield's debts were discharged on August 14, 1986, including
zgerald's scheduled judgment in this action. On August 27, 1986, the
stee filed her "Trustee's Report of Abandonment of Nominal or Encumbered
ets and Trustee's No Asset Report," stating there was no realizable equity
Critchfield's encumbered assets and his unencumbered assets were minimal.
On appeal, Critchfield has posed the following questions of substance
our determination: (1) In the absence of any federal bankruptcy court
er lifting the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) (Supp.
7) , was the state district court without jurisdiction to enter judgment in
s action, filed by respondent subsequent to his bankruptcy petition? (2)
e the findings in favor of the respondent clearly erroneous? (3) Did the
al court err in awarding respondent prejudgment interest from April 19,
3? (4) Is respondent entitled to recover against Northwestern on its
,000.00 attachment release undertaking even though the judgment against
tchfield has been discharged as his personal debt by his bankruptcy?
STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Critchfield first contends that, because Fitzgerald was involved in
fcruptcy proceedings when he filed this lawsuit and because there was no
truptcy court order permitting him to go forward with this case in state
rt despite the automatic stay, the state court was "without jurisdiction"
proceed to trial and judgment. The automatic stay provision states in part:
petition filed under ... this title ...
all entities, of-

operates as a stay, applicable

the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
Lnst the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
nencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
Le. ...

J.S.C. 362(a)(1) (Supp.1987) (emphasis added). As the Judiciary
aittee Notes to section 362 point out, the automatic stay protects the
:or from all collection efforts, harassment, and foreclosure actions. It
DWS the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan and affords
Lef from the financial pressures that led to the bankruptcy in the first
:e. It does not shield from suit an entity or person owing money to the
:or. See In re Precision Colors, Inc., 36 B.R. 429, 431 (S.D. Ohio 1984);
:e Stivers, 31 B.R. 735, 737 (N.D.Cal.1983).
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, section 362(a)(1) prohibits the
:itution or continuation of actions against the debtor, but it does not
rent actions by the debtor to marshal estate assets. In re Saxon Indus.,
>, 43 B.R. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y.1984). On the contrary, 11 U.S.C. Bankruptcy
s 6009 (1984) specifically provides that, "[w]ith or without court
roval, the trustee or debtor in possession may ... commence and prosecute
action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal."
jaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
Page 3

itzgerald v. Critchfield/744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987)

Section 3 62 likewise has no bearing on the power of the state court to
proceed to judgment on appellant's counterclaim against respondent. By its
terms, the automatic stay applied to actions that could have been brought or
to claims that arose prior to the filing of Fitgerald's petition. In the
case before us, there is no evidence or contention that appellant's
counterclaim arose prior to Fitzgerald's petition. Although Fitzgerald might
have sought the bankruptcy court's protection from the counterclaim in some
other manner, we hold that the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. 362
(a) (Supp.1987) was no bar to the initiation and complete litigation of this
action in state court. [1]
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING FINDINGS
Appellant assails the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
judge's findings of fact. His brief contains a heading "FACTS," under which
appellant has set forth both parties' "versions" of the facts. This does not
constitute a sufficient marshalling of the evidence in support of the
findings made by the court below. The requisite presentation of supporting
evidence is also not found in the argument portion of appellant's brief.
Appellant has, therefore, failed to meet his threshold burden on appeal, one
that is neither elective nor optional. Nor will we perform this task for him.
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (emphasis
added). We therefore conclude that the trial court's findings were not
clearly erroneous, Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), and affirm the $11,367.50 judgment
entered against appellant.
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Appellant's brief mounted a three sentence attack against the court's
award of prejudgment interest from April 19, 1983 at the rate of ten percent
per annum. That attack does not contain a single citation to any pertinent
case or statute. The trial court found that appellant owed but did not pay
respondent a sum certain from April 19, 1983, the date the last of
appellant's cattle were removed from respondent's premises. The law is clear
that respondent is entitled to prejudgment interest on this overdue debt from
that date until entry of judgment. Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315,
317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245
(1977); L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah
1980). Fitzgerald's failure to specifically plead a request for prejudgment
interest is of no consequence because "the interest issue is injected by law
into every action for the payment of past due money." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.
2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). Cf. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah
1987); Utah R.Civ.P. 54(c)(1). We affirm the inclusion of prejudgment
interest in the judgment.
RECOVERY ON ATTACHMENT RELEASE BOND
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Judgment was
the appellate
arent from the
tchfield filed
s after filing

entered against appellant Critchfield on April 23, 1984,
process commenced that June. For reasons that are not
record, appellant did not file a supersedeas bond.
his petition for bankruptcy on December 21, 1984, three
his brief on appeal. [2]
Because

this and until oral arguments herein, neither party had addressed the
tie of whether Critchfield's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy precludes
zgerald's recovery from Northwestern on its attachment release bond.
Utah R.Civ.P. 64C(f) governs the release of property or the discharge of
attachment. [3]
Fitzgerald secured a valid prejudgment attachment of
ty-six cows and calves owned by Critchfield. In order to obtain a
charge of the attachment, Northwestern furnished the required $14,000 bond
the form of an undertaking that acknowledged its joint and several
Dility for payment to Fitzgerald "of such sum may [sic] be recovered
Inst [Critchfield]." In an order issued after the show cause hearing on
Lhwestern's failure to pay, the trial court ruled that the Rule 64C bond
intended to guarantee any judgment recovered by Fitzgerald against
:chfield. See generally Restatement of Security 201 (1941). That
elusion has not been challenged on appeal.
Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 64C(g) requires the undertaking to "provide that each
sty submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court" and that the
sty's "liability may be enforced on motion and upon such notice as the
:t may require without the necessity of an independent action." Although
:hwestern's undertaking does not contain the precise words submitting to
jurisdiction of the court, the bond will be enforced according to the
as of the authorizing rule. See South Carolina Pub. Se-rv. Comm'n v.
Dnial Constr. Co., 274 S.C. 581, 266 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1980). Furthermore,
:hwestern made a general appearance at the show cause hearing, thereby
aitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce payment on its
staking. Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 n. 4 (Utah 1974); Frandsen
lolladay, 739 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah App. 1987).
Pursuant to Utah R.Evid. 201(a), this Court takes judicial notice of the
: that the judgment we affirm today was discharged as to appellant
:chfield on August 14, 1986, by order of the United States Bankruptcy
:t for the District of Utah, Bankruptcy No. 84A-03477. Entry of judgment
Lnst Critchfield in April of 1984 fixed Northwestern's liability and
Lsfied the only condition of the undertaking. The effect of Critchfield's
sequent discharge in bankruptcy is neither payment nor extinguishment of
judgment. The obligation remains in existence, but it has been divested
Lts character as a legally enforceable personal liability of Critchfield.
Lonal Fin. Co. of Utah v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d 9, 10 (1961).
lough execution on the judgment is now barred as to Critchfield, 11 U.S.C.
1(a) (1979), his post-judgment filing and discharge in bankruptcy have
released Northwestern from its obligation to Fitzgerald under the bond. "
Lscharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any
ir entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 U.S.
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:. 524(e) (1979). See Waller v. Heinrichs, 133 Wash. 7, 233 P. 23, 24
'1925) (applying similar provision in former
statute, Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
[1941).

See also Restatement of Security

202

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, and the case is remanded
:or entry of judgment against Northwestern National Insurance Company on its
ittachment release bond in accordance with this opinion. Costs on appeal are
iwarded to respondent Fitzgerald.
FOOTNOTES:
FOOTNOTES:
1. Critchfield and Northwestern have feebly tried to phrase this issue in
terms of subject matter jurisdiction which, if lacking in the state court,
could not be conferred by the parties. It cannot reasonably be argued,
however, that the state court was without subject matter jurisdiction over
this contract dispute. The federal statute in effect at the pertinent times
(subsequently repealed) gave the federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases under the bankruptcy code, 28 U.S.C. 1471(a)
(Supp.1987), but it did not withdraw from the state courts subject matter
jurisdiction over any suit involving a bankruptcy debtor. Cf. Morford v.
City of Omaha, 206 Neb. 271, 292 N.W.2d 778 (1980). Quite to the contrary,
Section 241(a) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act explicitly conferred on federal
district courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil
proceedings ... related to cases under Title 11." 28 U.S.C. 1471(b) (Supp.
1987) (repealed 1984). See In re Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of F S
Communications Corp., 760 F.2d 1194 (11th Cir.1985); In re Bible Voice, Inc.,
34 B.R. 733, 736 (CD.Ca.1983). Furthermore, even if the automatic stay was
applicable to either Fitzgerald's claims or Critchfield7s counterclaim (which
it is not), "it is well settled that the automatic stay of section 362 acts
as a stay of court proceedings but does not deprive the state court of
jurisdiction over the matter." In re Clowser, 39 B.R. 883, 884 (E.D. Va.
1984) .
2. A plethora of bankruptcies involving parties to appeals has prompted this
Court to require all counsel to certify, when a case is calendared for oral
arguments, that the appeal process has not been automatically stayed by the
filing of a bankruptcy petition.
3. (f) Release of property or discharge of attachment; undertaking required;
justification of sureties. At any time, either before or after the
execution of the writ of attachment, the defendant may obtain a release of
any property or a discharge of the attachment, as follows:
(1) To secure a discharge of the attachment the defendant shall
furnish a bond, with sufficient sureties, in a sum of not less than double
the amount claimed by the plaintiff, but not less than $50.00 in amount. The
conditions of such undertaking shall be to the effect that if the plaintiff
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overs judgment, the defendant will pay the same, together with interest
all costs assessed against him, not exceeding the sum specified in the
ertaking.
(2) To secure a release of property from the attachment the defendant
11 furnish a bond, with sufficient sureties, in a sum not less than the
Lie of the property to be re leased, but in no case in an amount greater
n necessary to obtain a discharge of the attachment. The conditions of
ti under taking shall be to the effect that if the plaintiff recovers
jment, the defendant will pay the same, together with interest and all
ts assessed against him, not exceeding the sum specified in the
srtaking.
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LtleCite: SHORELINE
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES, AND
CROSS-APPELLANTS
Shoreline Development, Inc., a
Jtah corporation; Milton Jones;
and Milton Hanks

v.

DEFENDANT, APPELLANT, AND
CROSS-APPELLEE
Utah County and American Fork
City

FILED: 05/19/1992
DOCKET NO.: 910241-CA
CLERK: Mary T. Noonan
JUSTICES:
CONCURRING
Billings, J.M. , J.
Russon, L.H., J,

DISSENTING
NONE

ABSTAINING
NONE

OPINION AUTHORED BY: BENCH, Russell W., J,

Shoreline Development, Inc., brought suit against Utah County for
services rendered by Shoreline in obtaining dredging Pumps intended to be
used by the County on Utah Lake. The trial court entered a partial directed
verdict in the County's favor dismissing Shoreline7s contract claims.
Shoreline7s unjust enrichment claim, however, was sent to the jury. The jury
found in Shoreline7s favor and awarded it $94,000 for the services rendered.
The County appeals and Shoreline cross-appeals. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1985, Shoreline entered into an agreement with American Fork City
[1] to operate a boat harbor the City owned on Utah Lake, which is located
in Utah County. It was determined that a dredge was necessary to develop the
•harbor. Shoreline began to investigate ways of obtaining a dredge and ended
up working with William Arseneau, the Director of State Surplus Property.
They identified certain surplus federal government dredges that could be
>released for use on this project. The principals of Shoreline spent many
hours working on the project in 1985. Beginning in the early part of 1986,
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*y were each working on the project an estimated 50 to 6 0 hours per week.
In mid-March, 198 6, a meeting was held with the Utah County commission
discuss the work being done by Shoreline for American Fork. All three of
i county commissioners attended, as well as Clyde Naylor, the county
ineer. During the meeting, Shoreline outlined a proposal whereby it would
.ain a dredge for the County and be g:i ven the exclusive rights to operate
on Utah Lake. Shoreline indicated it was focusing its efforts upon the
dge "Harding" which belonged to the Army Corps of Engineers and was
ated in Portland, Oregon. The dredge had two large dredging pumps that
Id be salvaged for the County. The Commission took a voice vote and
horized expenditure of $2,000 to get the project going.
Immediately after the meeting, Shoreline prepared a letter memorializing
agreement that had been reached with the commissioners. That letter was
d carried to the Commission the next day. When the written
orialization of the agreement was delivered, a check for $2,000 was given
Shoreline. No express written contract was executed by the parties.
Shoreline then moved forward under the understanding it had an agreement
h the County to obtain a dredge and set up business operations on Utah
e. Shoreline presented the County with written reports concerning its
estigation. Shoreline again met with two of the county commissioners to
cuss the project in general, and the dredge Harding in particular,
reline claims that the commissioners again took an express oral vote and
cifically authorized Shoreline to proceed with obtaining a dredge for the
city. One of the principals of Shoreline remembers a commissioner
sifically stating that no bid process was required in order for the
cement to be made.
After this second meeting with the COIimixssioners, Shoreline continued to
t towards obtaining the dredging pumps off the Harding for the County. In
Ly June of 1986, it became known that the dredging pumps were going to
3 it to Utah. The principals of Shoreline then met with the county
aissioners and other officials, including the mayor of American Fork. They
* totally surprised in that meeting when the commissioners thanked them
their efforts in obtaining the dredging pumps and then told them that
re was no deal in place, one of the commissioners suggested that Shoreline
nit a bill.
After Shoreline had been excused from the deal, the government paperwork
completed and the dredging pumps were delivered to the County. The
rty's engineer signed one document acknowledging that the value of the
Ige was $6,022,563. County commissioner Gary Anderson, in accepting the
Ige, also signed a document acknowledging its value at $6,022,563.
Shoreline presented a bill for $250', 000 to the County for the value of
services in obtaining the dredge. The County refused to pay the bill and
reline brought suit. Shoreline claimed the County was liable under an
ress contractual agreement that Shoreline would obtain a dredge for the
lty. In the alternative, Shoreline claimed that if there was no express
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:ontract, the County was liable under an implied-in-fact contract as
evidenced by the work actually performed by Shoreline. As a final
ilternative, Shoreline claimed that the County was liable for the unjust
mrichment it received from Shoreline7s efforts.
At the close of Shoreline's evidence, the County moved for a directed
rerdict as to the express contract and the implied-in fact contract claims.
?he County argued that it was protected from any contractual claims because
ut did not act in accordance with state code or its own customary practices
m dealing with Shoreline and therefore it could not be bound by those acts.
?h& County conceded at that time that the unjust enrichment claim could
)roperly be presented to the jury. The trial court agreed and granted a
Iirected verdict in favor of the County on .Shoreline's first two claims. The
bounty then rested, without putting on any case of its own, and the unjust
enrichment claim was sent to the jury. The jury awarded Shoreline $94,000
for services rendered. Shoreline then requested prejudgment interest on the
?94,000, but the trial court denied the request.
The County appeals, claiming it is shielded from the unjust enrichment
slaim by Utah Code Ann. 17-4-5 (1991) (corporate powers of a county), and
by Utah Code Ann. 63-30-3 (1989) (the Utah Governmental Immunity Act). [2]
The county also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether it
received a benefit from Shoreline's efforts. And finally, the County claims
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to take into the
jury room a deposition that had been read into evidence. Shoreline crossappeals the denial of prejudgment interest, claiming that interest may be
awarded in an unjust enrichment case. [3]
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Defenses
The County asserts that Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is precluded
by the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-3 (1989) and by Utah
Code Ann. 17-4-5 (1991). Neither of these defenses was raised below. In
fact, the County affirmatively stated that the unjust enrichment claim was
properly before the jury. We will not address these defenses raised for the
first time on appeal. See Zions First Nat. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The County challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding that the County received a benefit in the amount of $94,000. In
particular, the County argues that the benefit of Shoreline's services could
not have been $94,000 because the County received no "net benefit" from
obtaining the dredge. After the dredging pumps were removed from the dredge,
the County never made use of them. The County argues that it was simply
unable to find a way to retrofit the dredging pumps for use on Utah Lake. In
fact, the federal government ultimately repossessed them. The County errs,
however, in focusing on the "net benefit" of the entire transaction. The
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propriate benefit upon which Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is based,
i upon which damages must be awarded, is the service rendered by Shoreline
obtaining the dredge. The fact that following the receipt of this benefit
* County was unsuccessful in making a profitable use of the dredge is
naterial to the valuation of Shoreline's services
The County, not
Dreline, bore the risk the venture might fail.
The County has failed to satisfy its burden of marshaling the evidence
support of the jury's holding that it received a benefit worth $94,000.
iges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) (appellant must set
: all evidence that supports jury verdict, including all valid inferences,
i demonstrate "that reasonable persons would not conclude that the evidence
pports the verdict"). The County does marshal the evidence showing the
forts of Shoreline and attempts to counter it with some evidence of the
forts expended by the County and the State in an apparent attempt to show
it Shoreline was not the sole party involved in obtaining the dredge. The
Lmary focus of the County's marshaling, however, is on whether it received
r "net benefit" from the venture. The County has not marshaled the
Ldence in support of the $94,000 award. Nowhere in the County's attempt to
rshal is there any indication that the services rendered in obtaining the
>dge were not worth $94,000. We therefore do not disturb the jury award.
>, e.a., State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d.944, 947 (Utah App. 1990) (when
)ellant fails to marshal, reviewing court presumes that the holding is
squately supported by the clear weight of the evidence).
DEPOSITION
During its deliberations, the jury requested that the deposition of,
Lliam Arseneau be sei it i nto the jury room.. Due to the unavailability of
seneau, his deposition had been read in its entirety to the jury during the
Lai, The trial court refused to allow the deposition to be sent to the
:y room because Arseneau's written testimony might rece:7v- more weight than
ler oral testimony. The County argues that the t-rial court erred in not
Lowing the jury to review the deposition.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(m), the jury may not take
>ositions with them when they deliberate. [4] The question of whether
Ltten testimony should be allowed in the jury room has already been
Iressed in State v. solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), wherein
i supreme court held: "The law does not permit depositions or witnesses to
to the jury room.
In light of Ri lie <* / (m) ai id the supreme court's unequi vocal holding that
)ositions are not permitted in the jury room, we find no error.
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In its cross-appeal, Shoreline challenges the trial court's refusal to
ird prejudgment interest on the $94,000 unjust enrichment award. Shoreline
;erts that prejudgment interest should be available because an unjust
richment claim falls somewhere between the poles of express contract claims,
sgaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991 , 92, 93, 94
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oreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County,835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992)
here prejudgment interest is often allowed, and tort claims, where
rejudgment interest is seldom allowed. In particular, Shoreline asserts
hat the similarity between an unjust enrichment claim and a contract claim
eighs in favor of awarding prejudgment interest. Shoreline/s reliance on
he nature of the claim, however, is misplaced.
The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether the
amages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated with
athematical certainty. See, e.g., Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552
•2d 107, 108-09 (Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract was ascertainable
y calculation). "A court can award prejudgment interest only when the loss
s fixed at a particular time and the amount can be fixed with accuracy."
mith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 1 790 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah App. 1990). If the
ury must determine the loss by using its best judgment as to valuation
ather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is
nappropriate. Id. See Bjork v. April Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah)
ert. denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977) (where damages cannot be
alculated with mathematical accuracy, the amount of the damage must be
scertained and assessed by the trier of fact and rejudgment interest is not
1lowed); Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907) (
In all . . . cases where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly
ithin the province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no
nterest is permissible.").
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated that the lack of mathematical
ertainty generally prevents an award of prejudgment interest in equity
ilaims.
survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that
nterest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, in
.ctions brought on a written contract, and in an action to recover a
iquidated overpayment of water subscription charges. In many of these cases,
re stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the amount
>f the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with
rell-established rules of damages. No case has been cited to us where we
Lave allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant case,
rhich is for equitable relief. "A suit of this nature . . . invokes
:onsideration of the principles of equity which address themselves to the
:onscience and discretion of the trial court." In view of the highly
squitable nature of this action where the court has discretion in determining
:he amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff) , we find no error in the
lenial of prejudgment interest.
k

Jellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted)
[quoting Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976)).
Shoreline:asserts that there is a public policy ground for awarding
interest in equity cases despite the uncertainty of the damages. While we
recognize shoreline's concern that injured parties be made whole, we find
:hat this concern is adequately addressed by reason of the fact that equity
)laintiffs may claim lost interest as part of their damages. Uinta Pipeline
LegaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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reline Development, Inc. - Utah County,83 5 P-2d 2 07 (Utah App. 1992)
:p. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976) (where justice
i equity require, interest may be awarded as part of the damages). since a
ry has discretion to award interest as part of an equity judgment, there is
risk of double recovery if prejudgment interest may be added to a jury's
tity award by the trial court who does not know whether the jury's award
rers interest. In order to prevent such double recovery, we presume that
the claimant was entitled to any Interest, it was awarded by the jury as
•t of the equity award.
Given the risk of double recovery, and in light of the supreme court's
.ing in Bellon, we hold that prejudgment interest must be sought directly
damages in unjust enrichment cases, if at all. Prejudgment interest may
: be subsequently added by a trial court to a jury's award for unjust
ichment. We therefore find no error in the trial court's refusal to award
•reline prejudgment interest on the $94,000 judgment awarded by the jury.
CONCLUSION
As to the County's appeal of the judgment for unjust enrichment, the
nty failed to raise its defenses below so we do not address them for the
st time on appeal. As to the assertion that the trial court erred in
using to allow the deposition in the jury room, we find no error. As to
reline's cross-appeal requesting prejudgment i nterest, we also find no
or. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
FOOTNOTES:
- FOOTNOTES:
American Fork has settled wi th Shoreline and is not a party to this appeal.
The Governmental Immunity Act has since been amended, but withoi it change
the relevant language. See section 63-30-3(3) (Supp. 1991)
Shoreline also cross-appeals the dismissal of its contract claims I nit
y requests that we address these issues if we reverse the unjust
ichment award. Inasmuch as we affirm the judgment, we need not address
trial court's legal conclusions as to the first two claims.
Rule 47(m) provides, in relevant part and with our emphasis, ll[u]pon
iring for deliberation the jury may take with them the instructions of the
rt and all exhibits and all papers which have been received as evidence in
cause, except depositions ,
"
The supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Solomon in State v. Davis,
P.2d 5, 14-15 (Utah 1984).

jaSearch Improved Text, Copyright (C) Techno-Law, Inc. 1991, 92, 93, 94
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEVON D., INC
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

vs.

CV 89 401

MEMORANDUM DECISION

HOWARD W. NELSON, et al
Defendants.

This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before the
Court sitting without a jury.

The plaintiff appeared and was

represented by counsel Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.

The defendants

appeared and was represented by counsel M. James Brady, Esq.
The Court thereupon entertained the partial stipulation of the
parties stated into the record, heard the evidence adduced by the
parties in support of their respective positions, reviewed the
memoranda of counsel and upon being advised in the premises, now
finds and concludes as follows:
Findings
1.

No evidence was presented by PI to show the existence

of any oral contract between the PI and the Defs Nelson.

The

Court so ruled from the Bench.
2.

PI did with the knowledge and consent of Defs Nelson

pay for certain material installed in and labor performed upon
Defs Nelsons' residence situate at 1949 West 1600 North, Provo,
Utah.

(2)
3.

Defs Nelson have stipulated that PI has paid for

material installed in said residence and for labor performed
thereupon as follows:
Pis Exhibit No
Pis Exhibit No
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis
Pis

Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

4 (a)
7 (b)
6 (c)
12 (d)
17 (e)
19 (f)
20 (g)
21 (h)
22 (i)
23 (J)
29 (k)
32 (1)
43 (m)
45 (n)
46 (o)
64 (P)
66 (q)
75 (r)
78 (s)
87 (t)
88 (u)
92 (v)

Gary Young, labor:
Mount West Marble for bath
tubs and shower stalls:
Rite Cabinets for cabinets:
Grant Iverson, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
American Carpets, carpet:
Grant Iverson, labor:
Keith Lewis, labor:
Ron Critchfield, painting:
Tom Cottam, masonry labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Ron Critchfield, painting:
Grant Iverson, labor:
Grant Iverson, labor:
Keith Lewis, Labor:
Silo, materials:
Provo City Utilities:
Provo City Utilities:
Karol Christensen, labor:
Provo City Utilities:

228.00
1012.00"
3000.00
332 5096 00426 00384 0 0 ~
3000 00^'
190 oo350 001000 0 0'
1000 00'
252 00700 00414 0075 00600 oo-616 2325 0 1 12 9 0305 00^
1125 00$15143.64

That the above payments were made by PI between August 19 8?
and January 1989.
4.

There is evidence in the record to support the

contention of PI that PI paid for materials incorporated in said
residence and for labor performed thereupon as follows:

(a)(Pis Ex #2)
(b)(Pis Ex #3)
(c)(Pis Ex #8)

Ralph Watson, labor
Bryan Munch, sheet raking:
Belliston, paint:

132.00*"
1500.00^
530.87-

?rt
4 / Cfr^m

(3)
(d) (Pis Ex #10)
(e) (Pis Ex #15)
(f)(Pis Ex #24)
(g)(Pis Ex #26)
(h) (Pis Ex #31)
(i)(Pis Ex #33)
(j)(Pls Ex #35)
(k)(Pis Ex #36)
(I) (Pis Ex #38)
(m)(Pis Ex #39)
(n)(Pis Ex #41)
(o) (Pis Ex #44)
(p) (Pis Ex #47)
(q)(Pis Ex #48)
(r)(Pis Ex #51)
(s)(Pis Ex #52)
(t)(Pis Ex #53)
(u) (Pis Ex #54)
(v) (Pis Ex #56)
(w) (Pis Ex #57)
(x) (Pis Ex #58)
(y) (Pis Ex #62)
(z)(Pis Ex #63)
(aa)(Pis Ex #65)
(bb)(Pis Ex #67)
(cc) (Pis Ex #70)
(dd) (Pis Ex #71)
(ee) (Pis Ex #74)
(ff) (Pis Ex #76)
(gq) (Pis Ex #79)
(hh) (Pis Ex #89)
(ii) (Pis Ex #90)
(jj)(Pls Ex #99)
(kk) (Pis Ex #100)
(II) (Pis Ex #101)
(mm) (Pis Ex #102)
(nn)(Pis Ex #104)
(oo) (Pis Ex #120)
& 13 and 14)

Tom Cottam, brick labor:
Wayne Knight, labor:
L.C.Newbreast, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Bart Brian, labor:
Old Mill, woodwork:
C.P.C., concrete:
Gary Young, labor:
L.R.Johnson, door:
Ron Brown, labor:
RonCritchfield, painting:
Louis Pontia, labor:
Wayne Knight, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Randy Gordon, rain gutters:
Belliston's, paint:
Ron Brown, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Ted Chappel, labor:
Bart Brian, labor:
Young, labor:
Rick Johnson, plaster:
Wayne Knight, labor:
Gary Young, labor:
Rick Johnson, plastering:
Charlie Newbreast, labor:
Rick Johnson, plastering:
Gary Young, labor:
Grant Hone Excavating:
Neil Bullock, plastering:
Rick Johnson, plastering:
BMC Wests, materials:
BMC West, materials:
BMC West, materials:
BMC West, materials:
BMC West, materials:
LKL, dry wall
Total

1000.004S8T75^":
140.00'
912.00'
300.00"
180.00'
2000.00^
334.00-'
600.00112.501192.00"*
]277JL0_Ql.
r
4ToToO'
480.00'
382.00971.36'
502.50'
384.00456.00>6^."tKH:
lOo'.OO^
510. 00-^
500.00317.50"
144.00500.00-"
68.00*"
500.00-462.00"
250.00"
295.00"*
500.00-^
807.35^
12253.05 '
'1721.28
\__8JL9.07,
^ . 30.24**
2718.2~8
$ 25925.75

That the above payments were made by PI between June
and June 1989.
5.

That the only substantial evidence as to the value of

labor and materials is the amount of money paid therefor by

(4)
6.

That Defs Nelson have not paid PI for any of the labor

of material above indicated.
7.

That Defs Nelson have occupied said premises as a

residence since March of 1989.
8.

That Defs Nelson would have been required to pay the

same amount for the labor and materials above indicated to the
suppliers thereof had the PI not paid the same.
Conclusion of Law
BASED upon the foregoing the Court concludes as follows:
1.

No express contract or contract implied in fact existed

between PI and Defs Nelson.
2.

A contract implied in law did exist between PI and Defs

Nelson in that:
(a) Defs Nelson received a benefit by reason of
Pi's payment to materialmen and laborers
involved in the construction of Def Nelsons'
residence.
(b) Defs Nelson knew of and understood such benefit.
(c) Under the circumstances it would be unjust
for the Defs Nelson to retain such benefit
without paying for the same.
3.

That the aggregate value of the benefit conferred upon

Defs Nelson by PI is the sum of $41069.39 for which amount PI is
entitled to Judgment against the Defs Nelson.
4.

By reason of the highly equitable nature of this

proceedings and the fact that the measure of Pis recovery is based
upon the benefit conferred upon Defs and not upon the loss
sustained by PI, no prejudgment interest should be allowed.
(Shoreline Dev Co vs Ut Co., 187 UAR 26)
5.
incurred.

PI is entitled to recover its statutory costs of Court

(5)

Counsel for PI is directed to prepare and serve appropriate
findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment consistent with
the foregoing.
Dated this

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

CULLEN

cc:

Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.
M. James Brady, Esq.

CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

